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Firms may coordinate their R&D decisions
by a merger or an R&D alliance. The
European Union stimulates R&D alliances.
It expects that these stimulate R&D
investments, and guarantee that the
cooperating firms compete in the product
market. The alliances may, however,
stimulate firms to collude in the product
market. lliances then point to emerging
cartels. The paper explores the conditions
where this fear holds.
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11. Introduction
The increasing numbers of R&D alliances in, for example, the European Information Technology
industries show ample cases where the same firms meet each other over and over again as they
conclude one alliance after the other. Alliances may facilitate the formation of (implicit) cartels
among them. This paper discusses some evidence and explores this intuition by modelling the
effect of alliances on product market competition in comparison with the effect of mergers..
The 1980s witnessed a growth in the number of technology alliances among European
firms. This is especially striking in information technology (IT). Networks were created of private
technology alliances, along-side with EC-organised (and subsidized) alliances. Hagedoorn and
Schakenraad (1993) show that both networks created close links among Europe's leading IT firms.
In particular twelve European leading IT firms forged ever closer links by means of cooperative
R&D links.1 These Big Twelve participated in the Round Table that ushered in the ESPRIT
programme, the European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information
Technologies. A related programme is RACE (Research and development in Advanced
Communications technologies for Europe), a spin-off of ESPRIT. Including Eureka projects,
Information Technologies account for 64% (589) of the 920 joint cost-sharing technology projects
listed in the Merit-Cati database over the period 1983 to 1989. Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1993)
are able to demonstrate that the intensity by which a firm participates in private R&D technology
links is a significant explanatory variable for its participation in the European cost-sharing
programmes. That is, 'these subsidized R&D networks are added to already existing or emerging
private networks.' (op. cit., p. 387) The authors add, 'European cost-sharing programmes, as
developed during the 1980s, appear to play a role in a process of gradual concentration of the
                                                       
1. These were AEG, Bull, CGE, GEC, ICL, Nixdorf, Olivetti, Philips, Plessey, Siemens, STET,
and Thomson (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1993).
2European information technology industry towards a wide-oligopolistic structure in which only a
relatively small number of large European companies play an important role.' (p. 387)
A corollary of this point of view is that alliances may facilitate the formation of a cartel.
Mytelka (1995) argues that European IT firms did indeed more or less deliberately forge closer
links. They were losing market share over the 1980s. To counter this, they set out to coordinate
their strategies to catch up on their U.S. and Japanese rivals. Part of their strategy was to develop
themselves from national champions into European firms. They also needed better access to new
technology, while rethinking their product portfolios. The R&D alliances served the obvious
purpose of developing much needed new technology. They also, according to Mytelka, served the
additional purposes of helping to coordinate the catching up strategies. She argues that by the
beginning of the 1990s the cartel unravelled. The IT firms had failed to cooperate with the
potential (industrial) users of their technologies. For several European firms, their constant need to
reorganize prevented a commitment to their European partnerships, witnessing the policy changes
by firms such as Philips, Olivetti and Bull. Some of the Big Twelve lost their independence: AEG
to Daimler Benz, Nixdorf to Siemens, Plessey to GEC Siemens, and ICL to Fujitsu. Many turned
to non-European firms as sources of technology (e.g., Olivetti and Siemens).
The aim of this paper is to explore the proposition that R&D alliances aid the formation of
a cartel within a game-theoretical formulation. A model compares the strategic implications of an
alliance to those of a merger, which is an alternative way to coordinate R&D decisions. The
guiding hypothesis is that unlike a merger, an R&D alliance may stimulate tacit collusion. The
next section discusses some relevant theories. The subsequent sections develop the model. The
results contain the conditions where the hypothesis holds, that a merger disrupts collusion, whereas
an alliance sustains collusion. The appraisal offers a feedback to the discussion about the IT
industry, and cartel formation in the European IT industry.
32. Literature about R&D Alliances, Merger, and Cartels
The object of this paper draws together three often separate fields of analysis in industrial
organisation: merger, cartels, and R&D alliances. Mergers raise an industry's level of
concentration. High concentration levels may be conducive to collusion, which would explain the
positive effect of concentration on profit rates. Combining these insights, industrial economists
used to think that mergers would promote collusion (or tacit cartels). Davidson and Deneckere
(1984) reassessed this idea. They explore a merger by M firms among N symmetrical firms in a
homogeneous good Cournot oligopoly. They argue that the merger may disrupt collusion. In a
non-cooperative context, firms sustain collusion by a threat to revert to competition if a firm
defects from the collusion. This threat is more severe, the lower the profits firms will earn in
competition. The effect of a merger is that it raises the profits in competition (by creating market
power), thus reducing the threat value of a reversal to competition. The latter effect weakens the
cartel, and may destroy it. If firms anticipate this, they face the choice between either merger (and
thus competition, among a reduced number of firms) or collusion (by a larger number of firms).
This is an important insight, that drives much of the results of this paper.
Now turn to R&D. Firms may benefit from coordinating their R&D choices. There are
strategic reasons for this, as R&D may affect production costs (through process innovations), and
costs in turn affect competition in the product market. Know how may leak to other firms, in other
words, R&D may have positive spillovers on other firms. This provides firms with an additional
motive to coordinate their R&D decisions: to internalize these externalities. Two ways to
coordinate R&D decisions have received considerable attention in the 1980s and 1990s: merger
and R&D alliances. Consider some empirical evidence.
Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Süverkrüp (1994) conclude from the literature that technology
ranks in the middle of the strategic considerations of acquisitions (behind motives such as market
dominance, market shares, and cost reduction). In a sample of 86 German-American foreign
4acquisitions in 1978-1987, they distinguish the acquirers in four groups on the basis of their
motives: market-oriented entrepreneurs, short-term profit seekers, technology acquirers and
preemptive market protectors. The latter two are interested in technology transfers, and are mainly
located in high-tech industries. Technology plays a large part in some but not all mergers,
therefore. The same holds for alliances. For example, in a Belgian database of alliances, research
and development appeared the motive (or functional activity) for 20.9% of the non-Belgian
alliances, and 25.3% for the Belgian alliances (i.e., alliances which include at least one Belgian
firm) (Veugelers, 1993, p. 7).
In these cases, mergers and alliances are substitute sources of technology coordination.
This is confirmed by Link and Bauer (1989), who found that (according to the managers involved)
mergers and alliances were (on average) less important sources of technology than own R&D but
more important than licensing. Comparing the managers' views in 1982 to the ones in 1985, they
also found that mergers decreased in importance as a source of technology, whereas cooperative
research increased in importance.
The choice between merger and alliance depends on their salient differences. Industrial
economists stress one in particular. An alliance is topical: it coordinates a particular objective or
project. A merger or acquisition, instead, allows the firms to coordinate all decisions, from pre-
competitive decisions about R&D to product market decisions. D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and De Bondt and Veugelers (1991) analyze the implications of this in the following setting. Two
firms compete in the product market as Cournot duopolists (with heterogeneous products). They
also do R&D, which reduces their marginal costs, and thus affects their subsequent decisions about
output levels. Each firm's R&D has a positive spillover on the other firm's know how, and thus
reduces its marginal cost level as well. Both firms may compete both in R&D and, subsequently,
in output levels. If they form an R&D alliance, they coordinate their R&D decisions, while
competing in the product market. If they merge, they coordinate both their R&D and output
decisions (a merger). D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and De Bondt and Veugelers (1991)
5show that the greater degree of coordination achieved by the merger means that it is more
profitable than an alliance.
In order to understand the effects of an R&D alliance on cartel formation we need to
integrate the insights from the merger/collusion literature with the merger/R&D alliance literature.
We do so in a three-stage game. In the first stage, the firms merge or form an alliance. In the
second stage, they choose R&D levels. In the third stage, given the outcomes of the previous
stages, they choose output levels. The product market allows for the possibility of collusion. The
next sections discuss these stages, beginning with the last one.
3. Assumptions of the Model
Consider three heterogeneous products (i = 1..3), with a price:
(1) Pi = a-qi-bQi,
where qi is firm i's output level, and Qi is the aggregate output level of firm i's rivals. Products are
complements if b < 0, substitutes if b > 0, and homogeneous if b = 1. Marginal costs are constant
at ci (i = 1..3). Profits per product are
(2) pii = (a-ci-qi-bQi)qi.
Firms 1 and 2 may merge, hence there are either two or three firms in the market. If firms 1 and 2
merge, they create a multiproduct firm, as the merged firm continues to supply both products. To
focus on the decision by firms 1 and 2 to merge or, alternatively, to form an alliance, assume that
only they do R&D. Thus firm 3 is a non-merging, non-innovating rival (for convenience). 
The model is dynamic with the following time structure. At t = 0, firms 1 and 2 decide
6about the R&D levels. At t = 1, they introduce their innovation. They meet firm 3 in the product
market. They may either collude with firm 3 or compete. This interaction repeats itself through
time from period 1 onwards (an infinite repeated game).
Collusion introduces a time element in product market competition. This is inherent in the
idea of collusion by non-cooperative firms. In a non-cooperative context, each individual firm
gains from unilateral defection (by increasing the output relative to the collusive output levels).
Collusion can only be sustained by the threat to react to defection in the current period by a
punishment in the subsequent periods. Assume for convenience that firms support collusion by a
grim trigger strategy. That is, if a firm defects from the collusive output levels, qiC, the other(s)
punish it in the subsequent period by returning to the Cournot equilibrium, with Cournot output
levels qiP. They stay there forever. Firms discount future revenues with an interest rate r. The
discounted profits from collusion starting at period 1 are piiCn+piiCn/r, where the superscript C refers
to collusion and n (= 2 or 3) refers to the number of firms. If firm i cheats (defects) its colluding
rivals at period 1, it will be punished from period 2 onwards. Its discounted profits (at t = 1) are
pii
Dn+pii
Pn/r, where superscript D refers to cheating, and P to punishment (= the Cournot oligopoly).
Firm i will collude if and only if piiCn+piiCn/r ≥ piiDn+piiPn/r, that is,
(3) Collusion if
If equation (3) holds for all firms, the firms collude. At t = 1, the discounted profit flow of firm i
thus equals piiC(1+1/r). If equation (3) fails to hold for at least one firm, the firms compete instead.
7The discounted profit flow is piiP(1+1/r).2 Now consider R&D at t = 0. The effect of R&D is to
reduce marginal costs (process innovations):
(4) ci = c-Xi (i = 1, 2),
where Xi is the effective R&D or knowledge base. It results from R&D as follows:
(5) Xi = xi+βxj,
where β ∈ [0,1) is the spillover term, and xi (xj) is firm i's (j's) R&D level (i, j = 1, 2; i ≠ j). Due
to (unintentional) leaks, firm j's R&D spills over to increase firm i's knowledge level (if β > 0). To
express decreasing returns to R&D, R&D costs increase quadratic in R&D effort, (Γ/2)xi2
(D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). The expected profit at t = 1 is piiJ(1+1/r), where J = C
(collusion) or J = P (Cournot competition). The expected profit at t = 0 equals piiJ(1/r) which gives
the expected profit functions at period 0:
(6) Πi = piiJ(1/r)-(Γ/2)xi2, where i = 1, 2, 3 and J = C, P.
Maximization of this expression leads to the same outcome as maximization of:
(7) Πi = piiJ-(γ/2)xi2,
                                                       
2. The model thus assumes that demand for the product is constant, and the product has an infinite
life. This assumption does not hold in dynamic industries, such as the IT industries. Note,
however, that the interest rate r in the model can be interpreted as a function of the length of the
time period, the time preference of the players (or the market interest rate) and a probability that
the 'game' (i.e., the product's life) ends in the current period (Rasmusen, 1989, p. 90). Short
product life cycles (a high probability of a short life) thus translate in the model to a high interest
rate r.
8where γ ≡ rΓ. We compare two cases: merger (firms 1 and 2 cooperate in both stages) and
strategic alliance (1 and 2 cooperate only in the R&D stage). The resulting profits depend on four
parameters: the demand parameter b (product substitutability), R&D parameters β and Γ, and the
interest rate r.
4. The Third Stage of the Game: The Product Market
This section considers two cases: in case 1, firms 1, 2 and 3 compete or collude, and case 2: firms
1 and 2 merged into a two-product firm, which competes or colludes with firm 3.
4.1. Case 1: No Merger
This subsection explores the product market when the three firms compete. Three sub-cases
emerge: case 1.a, where the three firms compete, case 1.b, where the three firms collude, and case
1.c where one firm cheats against the other two, who collude.
Case 1.a: Cournot 3-firm oligopoly
The profit functions are as in equation (2). The first order condition for profit maximization is:
(8) a-ci-2qi-bqj-bqk = 0.
Solve this for the output levels:
(9)
9The superscript P for punishment refers to Cournot competition, and the number three refers to the
number of independent firms. Substitute these in the profit levels for the optimal profit levels:
(10)
Case 1.b: three-firm collusion
The firms choose the output levels that maximize their joint profit (Σi3pii). The second order
condition is satisfied by
(11) -½ < b < 1.
This assumption rules out 'close' complements and perfect substitutes. Standard computations give:
(12)
The superscript omits the number of firms as collusion in case 2 (a duopoly with the merged two-
product firm) gives the same outcome: it too maximizes Σi3pii. Output levels are certainly positive
if -½ < b ≤ 0. For the sake of the second stage of the game, I note the conditions for positive
output levels if c1 = c2 and 0 < b: 0 ≤ (a-c3)(1+b)-2b(a-c1) and 0 ≤ a-c1-b(a-c3). Define d1 ≡ (a-
c1)/(a-c3). These conditions amount to
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(13) Positive output levels qiC ( i = 1,2): b ≤ d1 ≤ (1+b)/(2b).
Substitute these output levels in the profit functions:
(14)
Case 1.c: defection by one firm while the others collude
Firm i defects by choosing the output level that maximizes its own profit, while its rivals choose
the collusive output levels, qjC. Standard computations give:
(15)
Substitute the output levels, qiD3, qjC and qkC, into the profit function of the defecting firm:
(16)
Sustainable Collusion if there are three firms
Equation (3) says that the firms sustain collusion if the interest rate is less than an upper bound,
rmaxi
n
 (for firm i and n independent firms). Compute this upper bound for firm i from the optimal
profit levels above. For the symmetric case where c1 = c2, and d1 is defined above:
11
(17)
where A1 = -20-4b2+8b, A2 = 4b(b2+5-2b), and A3 = -4(2b+1)(b-1). The same symmetry case gives
for firm 3:
(18)
where A1 = -8b2+4b+4, A2 = 2b3+4b2+6b-4, and A3 = -b3-b2-2b-4. For the case of full cost
symmetry, where c3 = c2 = c1, and consequently d1 = 1, the highest interest rate that sustains
collusion is:
(19)
4.2. Case 2: Merger by Firms 1 and 2
This case too consists of three cases.
Case 2.a: The merged firm competes with firm 3
The merged firm maximizes its profit over the products 1 and 2, which gives the first order
conditions:
12
(20) ∂pi12/∂qi = 0 = -2qi-2bqj-bq3+a-ci (i,j = 1,2; i ≠ j).
Firm 3's first order condition is identical to the one in case 1.a. The merged firm's second order
condition is satisfied by 1-√3 < b < 1+√3, which includes all cases allowed for by equation (11).
Solve the output levels:
(21)
(22)
For the special case where c1 = c2 (of interest in the second stage of the game), the output level of
the merged firm (per product) is positive if 0 ≤ 2(a-c1)-b(a-c3), which for positive b is guaranteed
by equation (13). Equation (13) also guarantees a positive output level to firm 3. Substitute the
output levels in the profit functions. The outcome for the merged firm is a long expression, which
for the symmetry case c1 = c2 simplifies to:
(23)
The outcome for firm 3 (returning to the general case where costs can be different) is:
13
(24)
Case 2.b: Collusion
If both firms collude by maximizing the joint profit Σi3pii, the outcome is the same as in case 1.b.
Case 2.c: one firm cheats against a colluding rival
The aim is to compute the profit of a firm which unilaterally defects against a non-suspecting,
colluding, firm. There are two cases to consider. If the merged firm cheats, firm 3 has the output
level in case 1.b. Taking this as given, the merged firm chooses the output levels that maximize its
own profit level. This gives:
(25)
Substitute the output levels in the merged firm's profit function, which gives (when c1 = c2):
(26)
If, on the other hand, firm 3 unilaterally defects from collusion, it takes the merged firm's collusive
output levels as given (see case 1.b), and then maximizes its own profit function. This gives:
14
(27)
Substitute this in firm 3's profit function, along with the merged firm's collusive output levels, to
find:
(28)
4.2.1. Sustainable collusion if there are two firms
Compute the maximum interest rate that allows collusion, defined by the right hand side of
equation (3). If the merged firm considers defection, this gives (for c1 = c2):
(29)
where A = d1(b+2)-1-2b, and B = -d1(b+2)-1+b2. For the full cost symmetry case, where c1 = c2 =
c3, and d1 = 1, this simplifies to:
(30)
15
If firm 3 considers unilateral defection, the maximum interest that sustains its collusion equals (if
c1 = c2):
(31)
where A = 2d1(1-b)+2+b, and B = -2d1(2b+1)+2+3b+b2. For full cost symmetry this simplifies to:
(32)
4.3. Collusion before and after a merger
The core idea in the merger / collusion discussion (Davidson and Deneckere, 1984) is the
Hypothesis: A merger disrupts collusion if
that is, a range of interest rates exists, such that at least one firm disrupts collusion after a merger:
min{rmax122,rmax32} < r, and all three firms sustain collusion if there is no merger: r <
min{rmaxi3}. First, consider the special case of full cost symmetry (d 1 = 1). The expression in
equation (32) is negative (for -½ < b < 1). That is, firm 3 defects if the merged firm colludes (as
rmax3 < 0 < r). Thus, if there is a merger, collusion certainly breaks down. If there is no merger,
the three firms collude if r < (2b+1)/(b+1)2 (see the previous sub-section). This extends the result
16
of Davidson and Deneckere (1984) to heterogeneous goods:
Proposition 1: If products are symmetrically heterogeneous (-½ < b < 1) and costs are symmetric
(c1 = c2 = c3), merger disrupts an existing state of collusion if 
For the more general case where c1 = c2 ≠ c3, d1 is a positive number. The rmaxin are functions in
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b and d1. The table gives
the results of a numerical
simulation. The column
on the left (exclude the 0
in the upper left corner)
gives the values of b
(from -0.499 to 0.999).
The top row gives the
values of d1 (from 0.1 to 2). The other cells contain the following codes. A '0' refers to a
combination (b,d1) that is not admissible by equation (13). Collusion is possible if the rmaxin are
positive for all firms (for a given n). If at least one rmax is negative, collusion is impossible. A '1'
refers to positive values of the rmaxin (i = 1..3; n = 2,3), such that collusion is possible both before
and after merger. A '2' refers to possible collusion before but not after merger. A '3' refers to
possible collusion after merger but not before. A '4' refers to impossible collusion either before or
after merger.
The table shows that (given d1), an increasing b reduces the scope for collusion as case 1
gives way to case 2 and finally case 4. Proposition 1 refers to case '2' as well as to those subcases
of case '1' (not highlighted) where condition (34) holds (while the rmax's are all positive). These
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cases occur, but so do all the others. This includes the opposite case 3, the IO folklore where
merger stimulates collusion.
In a dynamic context, the situation becomes still more difficult. The merger will lead to
different R&D levels than an alliance, and thus to different marginal cost levels. Not only will c1
and c2 generally differ from c3, but they will differ as to whether firms 1 and 2 merged or formed
an alliance.
5. The Second Stage of the Model: The Choice of R&D
Anticipating on the subsequent competition in the product market, firms 1 and 2 choose their R&D
levels. The merger and the alliance choose their R&D levels in exactly the same way: they choose
R&D levels that maximize firm 1 and 2's joint profits. The merger and alliance have different
implications only in the product market, where the merger acts as a single firm and the allied firms
act independently. In this model, therefore, mergers and alliances only have a single difference: a
merger coordinates both strategic (R&D) and tactic (output) decisions, whereas an alliance is
limited to coordinating a strategic R&D decision. This implies some notable assumptions:
1) There are no transaction costs in realising an alliance or a merger;
2) In both cases the firms choose R&D levels that maximize their joint profits, hence there is
no opportunism (often mentioned as a problem of alliances).
3) There is complete certainty about the profitability of the alliance, merger, and joint R&D
project.
In comparing the merger to the alliance I will first assume that the merger leads to Cournot
competition with firm 3, whereas an alliance leads to collusion. After computing the associated
outcomes (see the section on results), I check whether they are consistent with this assumption.
The solution to the second stage requires two steps. The first is to compute the joint profits of
firms 1 and 2 as functions of their marginal costs. The second is to compute the R&D levels that
18
maximize the joint profits.
The first step gives the joint profit of firms 1 and 2. If they remain independent (in an
alliance), they collude in the product market with firm 3. Adding the profits from the case 1.b, and
rewriting as a function of the marginal costs (c1, c2) gives:
(33) pi123 = Ac12+Bc1+Cc1c2+Dc22+Ec2+F;
where appendix A gives the parameters A through F (which depend on c3 and the demand
parameters, a and b). If firms 1 and 2 merge, they compete in the product market with firm 3.
Rewrite the joint profit of case 2.a (pi12P2) as a function of the marginal costs. This gives the same
expression for pi122 as for pi123 in equation (33), the only difference being the parameters A through
F (see appendix B). Note that D = A and E = B due to demand symmetry of firms 1 and 2. The
discounted joint profit of firms 1 and 2 at t = 0 equals (with D = A and E = B; see equation 7):
(34) Π12n = A(c12+c22)+B(c1+c2)+ Cc1c2+F-(γ/2)(x12+x22), where ci = c-xi-βxj (i, j = 1, 2);
where n = 2 (merger) or n = 3 (alliance). The first order conditions of optimality are:
(35)
.
..2 C β ..2 A β2 γ .2 A
C ..4 A β .C β2
C ..4 A β .C β2
..2 C β ..2 A β2 γ .2 A
x1
x2
.( )1 β ( )..2 A c B .C c
.( )1 β ( )..2 A c B .C c
The second order conditions imply that the determinant of the Hessian matrix should be positive
and the leading principal minor (the element in the left upper corner of the matrix) should be
negative (Beavis and Dobbs, 1990, p. 36, 25, and 379). That is:
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<..2 C β ..2 A β2 .2 A γ
and
.
<0 .γ .β12 G γ .4 G .16 A ..4 β1 G ..16 A β1 .β12 G ..4 A β12
The second condition uses simplified notation, where G = 2A+C; and β1 = 1+β. The former
condition implies that γ should be "sufficiently large". If also γ > Gβ12, then the second condition
implies that  should be positive. Rewrite this into:γ .4 G .16 A ..4 β1 G ..16 A β1 .β12 G ..4 A β12
(β1-2)2(4A-G) < γ. Hence "sufficiently large" γ satisfy the second order conditions:
(36) Second Order Conditions:
2Cβ+2Aβ2+2A < γ;
(β1-2)2(4A-G) < γ;
β12G < γ.
For convenience, write δ ≡ γ/β12. The third S.O.C. implies that G < δ (for both G in appendices
A and B). See the appendices for the values of G in the case of the merger and the alliance. It can
be seen that G for the alliance (appendix A) exceeds the size of G in the merger (appendix B),
with equality if b = 0. Thus rewrite the third S.O.C. into:
(36c)
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In terms of interpretation, given that δ ≡ γ/β12, γ = rΓ and β1 = 1+β, this condition means that r
should be sufficiently high (or the product life cycle sufficiently short), Γ sufficiently large (costly
R&D), and β (R&D spillover effect) sufficiently small. Solving equation (35) gives the joint profit
maximizing choice of R&D levels:
(37)
The R&D effort is positive if B+cG ≤ 0 (as γ-Gβ12 is positive by the second order condition).
Substitute the values for B and G from appendices A (for the alliance) and B (for the merger) to
find that this condition holds if:
(38) Positive R&D effort: 0 ≤ 2(a-c)-b(a-c3).
Substitute the optimal R&D effort into the marginal cost functions, ci = c-xi-βxj:
(39)
Since 0 < δ-G (the third S.O.C.), this expression is positive if δ is sufficiently large: -B/c ≤ δ.
The conditions B+cG ≤0 and 0 ≤ cδ+B are consistent as G < δ. Comparing B in appendices A
and B shows that both are negative, and -B for the alliance exceeds -B for the merger. Substitute
B from appendix A (the alliance) to find:
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(40) Positive marginal cost: 
Since B+cG is negative,  is positive. Hence, δ raises marginal cost. The
interpretation of δ is, therefore, the effective costliness of R&D (including product life cycle and
spillover effects). Since for infinite δ the model approaches the static product
market model of the previous section. Substitute the optimal R&D effort and associated marginal
cost level in the joint profit function:
(41)
5.1. Results of the Second Stage
Substitute the product market parameters A through F from appendices A and B into the optimal
R&D effort and marginal cost. Substitute these in turn in the output levels and profit levels to find
the results from the second stage of the game. For convenience, write ac for a-c and ac3 for a-c3.
Call the aggregate output level in the market, Q (= Σi3qi). If firms 1 and 2 merge, and compete
with firm 3 in the product market, the R&D, aggregate output and profit levels are:
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(42) x1
MER
.( ).2 ac .b ac3 ( )1 b
.β1 .b4 .4 b3 .8 b 4 δ .2 b 2
(43) QMER ..b
2 2 .2 b ( ).b ac ac3 .2 ac δ ac3 .b ac3
.b2 2 .2 b
2
δ 2 .2 b
(44) pi12
MER
...
1
2
( ).2 ac .b ac3 2 δ ( )b 1
.b2 .2 b 2
2
δ .2 b 2
Because of symmetry, x2 = x1. If firms 1 and 2 formed an alliance, and collude in the product
market with firm 3, the R&D, aggregate output and profit levels are:
(45) x1
ALL
.
1
2
( ).2 ac .b ac3
( ).β1 ( )...2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 δ 1
(46) QALL .1
2
( )....2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 ( )ac3 .2 ac δ .b ac3 ac3
( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )...2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 δ 1
(47) pi12
ALL
.
1
8
.....8 ac ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 ( ).b ac3 ac δ .b2 ac32
....4 b2 .2 b 2 δ 1 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
See appendix C for the output levels. Compare the R&D levels of the merger and alliance:
(48) x1
MER
x1
ALL
...ac ..
1
2
b ac3 δ b2 ( )b 2
2
..β1 .b2 .2 b 2 2 δ .2 b 2 ( )...2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 δ 1
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This give rise to
Proposition 2: The alliance invests a higher R&D effort than the merger (with equality for
unrelated products, where b = 0).
Proof. By equation (38), 2(a-c)-b(a-c3) is positive. Due to G < δ for G in appendices A and B, it
holds that (b2-2b-2)2δ-2(b+1) is positive (see appendix B) and 2(2b+1)(b-1)δ+1 is negative
(appendix A). QED
6. The First Stage of the Game: Choice of Merger or Alliance
The firms decide to merge if two conditions hold: 1) the associated profit in equation (44) exceeds
the profits of an alliance in (47); and 2) the hypothesis holds that the merger disrupts collusion,
while the alliance sustains collusion. The difference of the profit levels, ΠMER-ΠALL, is
(49)
where A = 8(2b+1)(b-1)(-2b+bd-1+2d)(-b2+bd+2d+1), B = -8-16b+4b2+12b3-b4, C = 2(1+b), D =
(b2-2b-2)2δ-2(1+b), E = 2(2b+1)(b-1)δ+1, and d ≡ (a-c)/(a-c3). The sign of the difference depends
on d (cost efficiency), b (product substitutability) and δ (the costliness of R&D). The difference of
the aggregate output levels is
(50)
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where A = 2(b-1)(2b+1)(b2-2b-2)(-b+2bd-2d-2), B = 2(2b+1)(b2+2)d-(b-1)(b3+14b2+22b+8), C = -
2(1+b), and D and E are defined as above.
Because of the complexity, I will numerically simulate the model. The parameters of the
simulation are ac (= a-c), ac3 (= a-c3), b and δ. It holds that ac = 1 throughout. The values of b
are in [-0.45,0.9]. The values of δ (= γ/β12) are such that equation (36c) holds for all simulated b,
i.e. δ in [3.5, 5.25] (the upper bound is arbitrary). The variables simulated are: DQ, which is
QMER-QALL, DΠ, which is Π12MER-Π12ALL, and the thresholds for the interest rates, rmaxin (i = 1, 3;
and n = 2, 3).
All simulations showed that the sign of DQ equals the sign of b: the merger raises the
aggregate output level if products are substitutes. If they are complements, an alliance leads to the
greater aggregate output level. If products are unrelated (b = 0), there is no difference between the
merger and alliance (neither in outputs nor in profits).
The table notes if the hypothesis (H), that merger disrupts collusion and an alliance
sustains collusion, is confirmed (at least for a range of interest rates).
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ac3 H confirmed DΠ Assumption
(pos. output
levels)
1 -0.3 ≤ b ≤ 0.45
[If 0.6 ≤ b, no collusion possible
either way;
If b = -0.45, alliance disrupts
collusion.]
- b < 0.9
1.4 -0.3 ≤ b ≤ 0; and b = 0.45.
[If b = -0.45 and 0.15 ≤ b ≤ 0.3,
alliance disrupts collusion;
If 0.6 ≤ b ≤ 0.75, no collusion
possible either way].
- (-0.3 ≤ b ≤ 0 plus the area
where b = 0.45 and 3.5 ≤ δ
≤ 3.889).
+ (b = 0.45 and 4.083 ≤ δ ≤
5.25).
b < 0.71
0.95 -0.3 ≤ b ≤ 0.15
[If b = -0.45, alliance disrupts
collusion;
if 0.3 ≤ b, no collusion possible
either way].
- b < 0.75
The table shows that cases exist where firms 1 and 2 either prefer to merge or to form an alliance.
Although the alliance sustains collusion with firm 3, this does not necessarily mean that it is more
profitable than a merger. In this model, therefore, the firms face a genuine choice between merger
and alliance. This complements the analysis in the seminal papers, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) and De Bondt and Veugelers (1991), where a merger is always more profitable than the
alliance.
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Simulations show that the merger is more profitable only if ac3 exceeds ac, that is, if c3 <
c (see the table, where ac3 = 1.4). That is, only if firms 1 and 2 want to catch up on an initially
superior firm 3, they may prefer a merger to an alliance. The reason is that the alliance leads to
collusion. Collusion allocates output levels so as to maximize joint profits. If firm 3 has low
marginal costs ex post (even taken into account the R&D undertaken by firms 1 and 2), then
collusion shifts most of the output to firm 3. In this case, it is better for firms 1 and 2 to merge
and to disrupt the collusion. The same holds for a high δ (see the table, ac3 = 1.4, b = 0.45, and
compare the outcomes when 3.5 ≤ δ ≤ 3.889 and 4.083 ≤ δ ≤ 5.25). If δ is high, the two firms
have low effective R&D levels, high marginal costs, and low market shares (in collusion). It is
then better to disrupt collusion by a merger. The merger is thus a defense mechanism by firms 1
and 2 against a superior (and mature) rival, especially if R&D is costly. One can hear such
defenses, and they may pertain to this situation. The merger is pro-competitive in that it destroys
the cartel.
Not all cases bear out the hypothesis that a merger disrupts, and an alliance sustains
collusion. If the products are close complements the opposite holds: the merger stimulates
collusion and an alliance would disrupt collusion. If products are moderately close substitutes, the
table indicates that no collusion is possible whether there is an alliance or a merger. This seems to
contradict proposition 1, where the hypothesis is confirmed for all b, as long as there is full cost
symmetry. The point is, with endogenous marginal cost levels either the merger or the alliance
may show ex post cost symmetry (c1 = c3), but not both at the same time. So proposition 1 never
emerges as a special case.
7. Appraisal
The model identifies the cases where R&D alliances may be conducive to collusion (if products
are neither close complements nor close substitutes). Compared with a merger, an R&D alliance
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leads to a higher R&D effort (proposition 2), but also to a lower aggregate output level (if
products are imperfect substitutes, see the table). A merger would disrupt collusion (if products are
substitutes).
What does this analysis imply for the IT industry? The IT industry displays two trends.
One is convergence: products become closer substitutes. Examples are computer operating systems,
telephone lines and cable (substitutes for interactive television), fax machines and computers
(where the latter have fax software plus a modem), and television and computers (substitutes for
interactive CDs and for on-line services). If products become better substitutes, this translates in
the model to increasing levels of b. A higher b destroys the possibilities for collusion, as the table
above shows (see also the first table). The other trend is shorter product life cycles, which
translates in the model to an increasing interest rate r and thereby, increasing δ. For some selected
cases (of b and a-c3), a higher δ may induce a switch from an alliance to merger, such that
collusion breaks down. Both trends, then, tend to destroy cartels.
This analysis sheds some light on the failure of the large European IT firms to establish a
cartel (Mytelka, 1995). If an alliance competes against a superior (lower cost) rival, shorter product
life cycles tend to lead to a merger and the disruption of collusion. This suggests a close link
between the failure to establish a cartel and the acquisitions that occurred among them (which
reduced the Big Twelve to a Big Eight). The convergence process in IT industries, shorter product
life cycles, and acquisitions in the European IT industry may thus have been conducive to the
cartel's demise in the 1990s.
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Appendix A
If the firms form an alliance, they collude in the product market with firm 3 which gives the
following parameters:
(A.1) A .1
4
( )b 1
( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
(A.2) B .1
4
( ).b a .b c3 .2 a
( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
(A.3) C .1
2
b
( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
(A.4) F ..1
2
a
( )a .b a .b c3
( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
(A.5) ; where G ≡ 2A+C.G 1
( ).2 ( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
D = A and E = B due to demand symmetry of firms 1 and 2.
Appendix B
If firms 1 and 2 merge and compete in the product market with firm 3, the profit function
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parameters are:
(B.1) A .1
8
.8 b .4 b2 .4 b3 b4 8
.( )b 1 b2 .2 b 2
2
(B.2) B .( )b 1 ( )
.b c3 .a b .2 a
b2 .2 b 2
2
(B.3) C ..1
4
b b
3
.4 b .4 b2 8
.( )b 1 b2 .2 b 2
2
(B.4) F ..1
2
( )b 1 ( )
.b c3 .a b .2 a 2
b2 .2 b 2
2
(B.5) , where G ≡ 2A+C.G .2 ( )b 1
b2 .2 b 2
2
Note that, again, D = A and E = B due to demand symmetry of firms 1 and 2.
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Appendix C: Optimal Output Levels
(C.1) q1ALL ..1
4
ac3 ( )....4 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 ( )b d δ b
( ).( )...2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 δ 1 ( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
where d ≡ (a-c)/(a-c3). The denominator is positive as b-1 < 0 and 2(2b+1)(b-1)δ+1< 0 (from G <
δ, with G for the alliance in appendix A). For a positive output level the numerator should also be
positive. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition is that
(C.2) b < d,
which is more restrictive than assumption (13) that b < d1 = (a-c1)/(a-c3), as c1 ≤ c and d1 ≥ d.
(C.3) q3ALL ..1
2
ac3
....2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 ( )b ..2 b d 1 δ 1 b2 b
( ).( )...2 ( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1 δ 1 ( ).( ).2 b 1 ( )b 1
The numerator is again positive. The denominator should be positive. -1+b2-b is negative on the
interval (-½,1). A necessary (but not sufficient condition) is, given that b-1 < 0, that -(1+b)+2bd is
negative, which is always true for b ≤ 0, and which otherwise implies that d < (1+b)/(2b), which
follows from equation (13). This condition also implies (for 0 < b) that b < 1/(2d-1). If, for
example, as in the text, a-c = 1, and a-c3 = 0.95, then b < 0.90, which excludes close substitutes.
(C.4) Positive q3ALL: 0 < 2(2b+1)(b-1)(2bd-(1+b))δ-1-b+b2.
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(C.5) q1MER ...1
2
δ b2 .2 b 2
.ac3 ( )b .2 d
.b2 .2 b 2
2
δ 2 .2 b
The numerator is positive by the assumption that G < δ for the merger (see appendix B). The
expression b2-2b-2 is negative on (-½,1). Due to (C.2), b(a-c3)-(a-c) < 0, hence b-2d < b-d < 0. So
positiveness of the output level is guaranteed.
(C.6) q3MER .ac3 ..b
2
.2 b 2 ( ).b d b 1 δ b 1
.b2 .2 b 2
2
δ .2 b 2
The numerator is positive. The expression b2-2b-2 is negative. A necessary condition for a positive
output level is bd-(1+b) < 0, which is always true for b ≤ 0, and otherwise implies that d <
(1+b)/b, which follows from a-c ≤ a-c1 and equation (13). A sufficient condition is:
(C.7) Positive q3MER: 0 < (b2-2b-2)(bd-(1+b))δ-(1+b).
